Belarus and Europe: slow thaw, road still slippery

Still standing in Minsk: Lenin lords it over the Belarusian capital. Photograph: Reuters

It seems that Belarus, popularly dubbed Europe’s last dictatorship, is finally emerging from its international isolation. The attempts by Alexander Lukashenko, the country’s president since 1994, to put his undemocratic regime back on European decision-makers’ maps were proven successful on November 30, when Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi arrived in Minsk on an official visit.

Berlusconi’s stay may be seen as a result of Lukashenko’s recently accelerated efforts, as it marks the first visit of a Western leader to Belarus in at least ten years. Until now, none had wanted to shake the dictator’s hand in front of the cameras. But diplomatic winds between the West and Belarus have changed of late and under the EU’s new diplomatic command, they may evolve even further.

The recent lifting of sanctions by the EU, as well as engaging Belarus in the Eastern Partnership initiative alongside five other post-Soviet republics, have certainly warmed up Brussels’ relations with Minsk. In return, among usual reform promises, Lukashenko has stated that the death penalty in Belarus, which is the last country in Europe still carrying out executions, could soon be banned. Minsk’s reluctance to abolish capital punishment has led to its exclusion from the Council of Europe.

Should Belarus’ authorities decide to ban the death penalty, Europe would be able to engage in an efficient dialogue with the regime. Yet any attempts to draw the country away from Moscow, its habitual patron, have little chance of being successful. Without Russia’s oil and gas, which Minsk purchases at highly preferential prices, Belarus’ shaky and obsolete economy would have sunk a long time ago. But do these conditions disqualify attempts to attach Belarus more firmly to Europe as unrealistic?

Not necessarily. Given that the past effects of Europe’s policy of isolation towards Belarus were far from satisfactory and did not bring the anticipated democratisation one inch closer, reshaping relations with Minsk seems both advisable and inevitable – even if it may leave the country’s democrats with an initial impression of being left behind by the West. To avoid creating further turmoil amidst the already internally divided opposition, which has been Lukashenko’s long-term objective, Europe should therefore persist in sending the Belarusian opposition a clear message of support, in spite of holding talks with the regime.

All the same, Europe’s past relations with Belarus have shown that once the regime has banked Western economic aid, previously made commitments are of little importance: Lukashenko has been known to make sudden U-turns on all democratic amendments. The remaining question is: will Europe trick Belarus into democratising, or will Belarus trick Europe into pouring much-needed euros into its coffers in exchange for empty promises?

In the end, for every euro spent on financial aid for Belarus, rigorous stipulations have to be set. And if engaging in bilateral talks with Lukashenko’s regime is to be one pillar of a policy aimed at bringing Belarus back into the European fold, funding the country’s independent media and NGOs must be the other. Without maintaining a proper equilibrium between these two measures, European efforts for a democratic Belarus will fall short of their purpose. And they will only reinforce Lukashenko’s legitimacy at home and abroad.