An emerging Obama doctrine?

Union in a state: Obama has recognised that "America alone cannot secure the peace." Photograph: Official White House photo by Pete Souza

In the middle of US President George W Bush’s first term in office – in the summer of 2002 – Robert Kagan came out with an influential article, Power and Weakness, that distilled a compelling rationale for the use of power and force in American foreign policy.

Kagan’s article, considered a significant intellectual contribution to the “Bush doctrine”, was published in the midst of the resurgence of neo-conservatism and was illustrative of the deep division of trust between the muscular “cowboy” unilateralism of Bush, and the cautious incrementalism of Europe. It was a time of bombast and hubris. The American foreign policy establishment had little patience or interest in reflecting on whether the key tenets of the Bush doctrine – preemptive war, unilateralism, quick use of power to achieve foreign policy objectives, and democracy promotion – would actually lead to an effective result.

Fast forward to President Obama’s first twelve months in office. The ensuing years had served to discredit many of Kagan’s arguments. Preemptive war, unilateralism and quick resort to force had led to nearly disastrous results in Iraq and had significantly damaged America’s broader standing and influence in the world.

Obama’s Nobel prize acceptance speech in Oslo last December represented his first public attempt to present an alternative foreign policy vision. While he notably agrees with the Bush administration on the utility of the "just war" doctrine – affirming that sometimes the use of force is not only necessary but morally justified – on most other issues Obama tacks in a very different direction.

The president emphasises that all countries must adhere to standards that govern the use of force. He repudiates unilateralism and pointedly notes that “America alone cannot secure the peace.” And he cautions that where the use of force is necessary, “we have a moral and strategic interest in binding ourselves to certain rules of conduct,” a very direct rejection of the policies on torture implemented by the previous administration. Most of all, Obama calls for a foreign policy that will work through institutions and existing processes, and build consensus, as opposed to an approach based on military might and unilateral preemptive action.

It is too early to know whether this speech represents the foundation of a new Obama doctrine. But it is a helpful guidepost that allows us to better understand five key trends and principles that will shape his foreign policy.

First, the ambition of the president's foreign policy agenda will continue to be shaped and limited by the comparative priority of his domestic agenda. Foremost on his plate is reversing job losses and buttressing America’s fragile economic recovery. All other considerations either link to these issues or are secondary. The key question is: does Obama have the time and political capital to push a positive and activist foreign policy agenda? Can he afford to be more than a participant in prearranged political gatherings (Copenhagen summit, G20), or a manager of unexpected foreign policy or humanitarian crises (Haiti)?

Second and related, Obama will continue to emphasise a pragmatic foreign policy focused on immediate, near-term challenges. This means continued time and resources focused on Afghanistan/Pakistan, and sustained political attention towards Iran’s nuclear capability. It may mean diminished attention towards reviving the Middle East peace process, or avoiding bold new commitments to the UN's Millennium Development Goals.

Third, the US and Europe will continue to reduce their philosophical and ideological tensions over the course of the Obama administration. The transatlantic relationship will remain a key focal point for Europe, but the continent will increasingly turn inward and be consumed with questions of identity and integration, from post-Lisbon Treaty leadership uncertainties and struggles with Muslim inclusion, to grappling with a dormant economy and high levels of unemployment.

Fourth, Obama will continue to reverse the Bush administration’s hostility to multilateral institutions, and embrace international organisations and multilateralism as essential pillars of American foreign policy. Obama will look to the UN, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank as a means to strengthen and expand new international norms in arms control, human rights, cybersecurity and other areas.

Fifth, China will continue its ascendancy as the single biggest foreign policy challenge for the United States. As China gains confidence in its economic prowess, it will advance an expansionist agenda that will challenge the US in a host of spheres, from the economic and political, to the military, scientific and technological. It is no accident that Obama included such a heavy emphasis on clean technology and innovation in the State of the Union address – whether China or the US prevails in this arena will ultimately determine the longevity of American geopolitical and economic hegemony.

Steven Feldstein is a member of the British Council’s Transatlantic Network 2020, a network for action which brings together young influencers from business, civil society, the arts, science and media to revitalise transatlantic and global links for the future. Importantly, TN2020 reflects the changing demographics, ideologies and dynamics of Europe and North America. Its members collaborate on projects which address one of three focus areas - sustainable living; building resilience in communities; creativity and innovation.

The views expressed in this piece are those of the writer and not the British Council.